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It is now generally accepted by researchers (although
not by governments) that famines are caused as much
by act of man as by act of god. But our understanding
of famine is still quite rudimentary, and what little we
know is rarely translated into policies to prevent or
control famine. Few people would argue that we
clearly understand what makes people vulnerable to
famine, or that we can predict that one group will be
vulnerable while another will flot.
It is not even clear, when different people talk about
famine, that they are talking about the same thing.
Those who suffer from famine have a more exact
vocabulary than those who analyse it. Turkana
herders in northern Kenya distinguish 'years in which
people died' from years of less severe shortage [Swift
1985]. In Darfur, the former contingency is known as
'famine that kills' [de Waal 1987] and in Hausaland,
northern Nigeria, as the 'great hunger' [Watts 1983].
to distinguish it from events in which there is hardship
but no large-scale mortality. Social and economic
analysts on the other hand, tend to lump all major
food shortages together as famine, and populists use
the term for any general shortage of a desirable good,
as in 'book famine'.
There is even some doubt about what exactly a famine
is. Famine is traditionally seen as a food or subsistence
crisis, resulting from an absolute shortage of food, or
an inability by some groups to gain access to food.
Rcently however, de Waal [1989] has put forward a
'health crisis model' to replace this 'starvation model',
arguing that most modern African famines, especially
Darfur in 1985/86, are in fact crises of epidemiology
and susceptibility to disease, caused only indirectly -
if at all - by a food crisis. I will assume here, without
making the point in detail, that health crises and food
crises are in fact closely related, indeed that a more
general crisis - a social and economic crisis - is
involved. I assume that the danger of famine is of a
sudden, catastrophic and prolonged consumption
deficit, accompanied by a surge in disease, and by
major social and economic disruption. The order in
which these occur and their relation to each other is an
urgent current research priority, but it is not the
subject of this article. Here I use consumption deficit
as a proxy for this complex of dislocations.
Vulnerability is not simply another word for poverty.
Poor people are usually among the most vulnerable,
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but understanding vulnerability means disaggregating
poverty. Landless labourers and people in informal
urban service trades, whose income in most years may
be as high or higher than poor farmers, are often more
vulnerable than the latter to a drought or other
disruption of the rural economy. Share-croppers or
even bonded labourers may be less well off most of the
time than small farmers, but have a better guarantee of
a subsistence minimum in bad years. Small
pastoralists may have a reasonable cash income and
high nutritional standards most of the time, but are
especially vulnerable to disruptions of the livestock
market or to epidemic animal disease.
In this article I analyse what makes people vulnerable.
This involvesa further distinction between two levels
or categories of causation of famine. I distinguish here
between the proximate or intermediary variables,
which are the direct links to famine, and theindirect or
primar.j'factors, which are the more general ecological,
economic or political processes determining whether
communities thrive or decline. Drought, animal or
plant disease, urban bias, agricultural pricing policy,
civil war and many others are primary factors in
determining vulnerability, but they act in different and
often complex combinations through three proximate
factors: production, exchange and asset processes. It is
the role of these proximate variables that is described
here, since they offer a way of classifying and
understanding how vulnerability is created and
maintained, and possibly how it can be reduced.
Production Failures
Our first understanding of famine was that it is caused
mainly by production failures. We may picture this as
a simple cause and effect chain as follows:
Diagram J
PRODUCTION CONSUMPTION
Factors which act on the production box, and which
can lead to consumption failure, include drought,
flood, or animal and plant disease. Vulnerability is
increased or decreased by general ecological potential
(low potential leads to low and variable production
and thus to higher risk of production and
consumption failure), technology, crops and cropping
strategies, and the possibility of alternative income-
generating strategies. In this production-based view,
famine vulnerability is mainly the result of uncertain
production, and famine is directly caused by
production failure, due for example to drought (the
African famines of the 1910s. 1970s and 1980s), to
animal disease (the African famines of the l890s.
following a rinderpest pandemic), to plant disease(the
Irish potato famines), or even to the refusal of farmers
to cultivate (one official view of the Ukrainian famine
of the l930s).
Exchange Failures
Building on the insights of Indian famine com-
missioners since the 1860s. Amartya Sen showed in a
classic book, Poverty ana' Famines [Sen 1981], that
famines could, and often did, take place where there
was no production failure, or where food was readily
available. He identified failures in the exchange or
market mechanisms as a key cause of famine among
poor people. Sen argued that the value of poor
people's production activities or endowments - their
labour, cash crops, or animals - is liable to collapse in
relation to staple food prices. When this happens,
poor people starve, not because there is no food
available (the production failure view), but because
they cannot afford to buy food: the wage labour rate
or the value of their animals or cash crops is too low in
relation to food prices for them to acquire enough
calories. We may think of this as a failure in terms of
trade, or an exchange rate failure. Sen's case histories
show that exchange rate failures of this sort are an
important trigger for famine in Africa and Asia.
The two main sources of terms of trade vulnerability
for the rural poor are the wage labour market and
commodity markets for agricultural and pastoral
products. We may add these to the diagram of the
famine causal chain.
Diagram 2
PRODUCTION CONSUMPTION/
Sen's analysis identified some important sources of
vulnerability, He showed for example that, especially
in South Asia, agricultural wage labourers and people
in small scale service trades are particularly vulnerable
because ofthe sensitivity of their wage rates to changes
in the wider economy. In Africa. with the possible
exception of Sudan. this is not so much the case
because of the much smaller proportion of people in
such employment: African casual and informal sector
urban wage labour markets seem less volatile and
immediately responsive to external shocks and
production crises such as droughts. In Sudan however.
viriability in seasonal agricultural wage labour rates is
an important source of vulnerability.
On the other hand, in Africa it is the pastoral
economies that form a major population group
vulnerable to terms of trade failures. African
pastoralists now get a large part of their subsistence
through market exchanges or barter deals. West
African pastoralists almost all get morethan half their
total calorie intake in cereal form, acquired by the sale
or barter of animals or animal products. In Sudan and
east Africa, the proportion is more variable, with some
pastoral groups still heavily dependent for calorie
intake on milk, meat and sometimes blood produced
within the household, although even these groups
depend much more on cereal markets in bad years.
Pastoral terms of trade under normal circumstances
mean that calories of animal origin are considerably
more expensive (usually in the range of two to five
times more) than calories of vegetable origin. This
means that pastoralists can usually get cereals at a
substantial discount in exchange for animal products
through the market.
It does however make pastoralists especially vulnerable
to changes in the normal animal-to-cereal price ratios.
If animal prices fall (because animals are in poor
condition, or many herders are selling, or few people
want to buy), pastoralists face an exchange crisis even
if the price of cereals does not rise, although the same
forces that bring down animal prices are likely to push
up cereal prices. All recent African famines in pastoral
areas have been characterised by this price scissors
effect. Of course, such failures in the exchange box in
the diagram above are compounded by failures in the
production box. Often the same events - drought or
animal disease - trigger failures in both boxes at
once, with a synergistic effect on consumption
patterns.
Sen's analysis has made a major contribution to our
ability to understand how famine works, and by
focusing attention on exchange or terms of trade
relationships helps identify the people and com-
munities most vulnerable. But it leaves several
important questions without an answer:
(i) Although exchange rate failures can be an
important famine trigger, in fact they do not help
very much in understanding or predicting the
timing of the onset of the sudden collapse in
people's ability to feed themselves, and they offer
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very little explanation of the apparent cumulative
vulnerability of some communities. The break-
down in a community's ability to provide for
itself, or in the ability of some members to
provide for themselves, often happens some time
after the failure of exchange or terms of trade
relationships, just as it may occur one or two
years after the onset of drought. Indeed the
collapse sometimes takes place when the
production and exchange situations appear to be
improving. It seems as though there is a threshold
of individual and community impoverishment,
not immediately explained by production or
exchange factors, at which the ability of
households or communities to survive collapses.
In a wider sense, the explanation is an ahistorical
one, unable to cope with changing vulnerability
over time except by pointing to changing
exchange or terms of trade risk. In fact, Sen's
analysis treats each crisis as a new event,
unrelated to earlier or later crises.
(u) Sen does not adequately explain the differential
vulnerabiliti' within some communities or
between similar communities apparently facing
similar production or exchange failures. Two
examples will illustrate this: (a) in the west
African Sahel, some pastoral communities such
as the Twareg are divided into ethnically
stratified groups of free people and former slaves;
these groups may now be equally poor, but they
do not seem to be equally vulnerable to famine;
(b) refugees in camps near capital cities (for
example Khartoum) are not as vulnerable as
refugees in rural camps (for example in south
Kordonfan or Darfur). even though the former
have no more resources than the latter, and are
equally affected by exchange failures.
Sen's work has the virtue of focusing on the
differential role of poverty within communities,
but has problems as an analytic tool since it looks
mainly at households; it does not help very much
in analysing differential vulnerability bet;t'een
individuals ii'ithin households, nor to certain
aspects of vulnerability of entire communities.
The work does not help us understand apparent
differences between communities in their
expectations of government assistance. Ethiopian
villagers apparently readily move to the roadside
or to administrative centres in times of crisis;
Sudanese villagers in Darfur and most Sahelian
pastoralists do not. Such differences are an
important part of vulnerability and are also
crucial to planning a relief effort, but exchange
failures do not have an explanation.
(y) Sen's work does not explain the behaviour of
many households faced by famine, who may go to
considerable lengths to preserve their assets at
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almost any cost. The case of households which
send some members to relief camps where
mortality is known to be high, rather than further
deplete their assets, or refrain from cutting down
valuable trees or selling their last animals are well
documented [see for example de Waal (1987) on
Darfur]. Indeed, people in relief camps, despite
the degradation and health dangers, commonly
hoard relief food in order to acquire further
assets, or to delay the moment when they have
again to live from productive assets.
The work does not satisfactorily explain what
happens afier a famine, when production and
exchange relationships return almost to normal,
although some households and communities
remain much more vulnerable than others in
ways production or exchange failures cannot
satisfactorily account for.
Sen's work treats uar and civil disturbance as
external to the model. Yet clearly civil war and
other major disturbances are crucial to under-
standing vulnerability and famine in situations as
different as Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique and
Kampuchea.
Sen is aware ofthese problems. The main statement of
his argument in Poverty and Famines tries to deal with
them by broadening the field of concern to the concept
of entitlements, rather than the narrower notion of
exchange or terms of trade relationships. Entitlements,
as defined by Sen, include all the productive resources
owned by a household, including its labour power,
and all its tangible assets; Sen also includes, although
almost as an afterthought, social security provided by
the state. However in his detailed analysis of cases, he
deals almost entirely with production and exchange
failures, concentrating on the relative role of each in
the genesis of particular famines. Under the label of
entitlements, he is in fact concerned with wage labour
rates and livestock prices relative to grain prices.
As Sen himself states, his analysis is a sophisticated
poverty analysis, and famine vulnerability is treated as
synonymous with poverty. In his view (a) vulnerability
to famine is a direct function of relative poverty, and
(b) relative poverty is a direct function of a
household's ownership of tangible resources or
endowments (labour, land, animals), and the rate at
which it can exchange these for food.
We may ask whether either of these propositions is
entirely true. Are the poorest people, and only the
poorest people, the most vulnerable to famine? Is their
poverty - defined in terms of the ownership (in a
liberal, market economy sense of ownership) of
mainly physical endowments - the main cause of
their vulnerability?! think this may not be so, as I will
attempt to show in the following argument. In
particular, perhaps we need to introduce a better
concept of risk - risk of future catastrophic collapse
of consumption - into the definition ofvLllnerability.
Assets
Can we improve our understanding of vulnerabilty
and famine by including in the model a more detailed
analysis of the role of assets in a wide sense? This
means separating out the terms of trade part of Sen's
entitlement analysis, confining it to questions of
exchange rate failure, and then analysing in more
detail the other types of entitlement hinted at by Sen.
By assets in this context I mean a wide range of
tangible and intangible stores of value or claims to
assistance which can be mobilised in a crisis. A
preliminary list of household assets relevant to famine
vulnerability might be as follows, subdivided
somewhat arbitrarily into investments, stores and
claims:
(j) Investments
- human investments, including investments in
education and health;
- individual productive assets, including animals,
farming equipment, houses and domestic equip-
ment, land, trees, wells;
- collective assets, such as soil conservation or water
harvesting works, irrigation systems, access to
common property resources.
Stores
- food stores, granaries etc.;
- stores of real value, such as jewellery, gold;
money or bank accounts.
Claims
- claims on other households ii'ithin the community,
for production resources, for food, labour or
animals;
- claims on patrons, big men, chiefs or other
communities for help in need;
- claims on the government;
- claims on the international community.
Assets in this broad sense (including investments,
stores and claims) are created when production leads
to a surplus beyond immediate consumption
requirements, and households use this surplus,
willingly or unwillingly, to invest (including investment
in better education or health), to build up physical
stores of all sorts, and to invest in claims' by putting
more resources into the community or government.
This last category covers a wide range, including stock
friendships, common among African pastoralists,
whereby animals are loaned between kin and friends,
other sorts of loans and gifts, traditional tribute and
tax payments. contributions to community funds and
resources, and the payment of taxes and other
contributions to government.
Many of these assets are cashed in when households
face a crisis: production assets are sold, granaries are
emptied. jewellery is sold, bank accounts emptied,
loaned animals recalled, labour debts called in and
community support mechanisms activated. The
sequence in which these assets are called in at different
levels of crisis is an important theme for famine
research. The sequence is mainly determined by the
status ofdífferent categories of asset. Investments and
stores are generally resources under the individual
control of households, and can be mobilised by that
household alone or in conjunction with others (in the
case of collective assets): claims, on the other hand,
refer to a range of wider social and political processes,
whose activation depends on some level of collective
decision.
Assets create a buffer between production, exchange
and consumption. Production and exchange activities
create assets, and in case of need assets can be
transformed back into production inputs. Alternatively
assets can be transformed directly into consumption,
or indirectly through an exchange mechanism. The
diagram below adds assets to the picture of casual
pathways between production, exchange and
consumption.
Diagram 3
Investments Stores Claims
ASSETSI,
PRODUCTION CONSUMPTION
EXCHANGE
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The notion of claims in this respect is shorthand for a
variety of redistributive processes within smaller and
larger communities, ranging from households and
extended families, through shallow kinship groupings
to major lineages, and up to the level of traditional and
modern political formations. At the simplest level,
groups of kin and friends help each other with food,
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labour or other resources. Such gifts and loans are
made with varying expectations of reciprocity, but all
involve an implicit recognition that membership of a
community involves both an obligation to share
resources, and a right to support from the community
in case of need. In some cases this idea of reciprocal
support goes so far as to throw doubt on the
comparability of customary notions of private
property with the classical liberal economy view,
which is an important part of Sen's concept of
entitlement. In many African pastoral economies, for
example, the idea of private ownership of animals.
especially large stock, is tempered by an ideology of
collective clan property in the same animals, through
which the clan as a whole has the duty and the power
to redistribute animals from wealthier to needier
people in a crisis.
At higher sociological levels, within both traditional
and modern polities, the notion of claims merges with
ideologies of community redistributive taxes (such as
the zekkat now common in one form or another in
Islamic Africa) designed to ensure survival of the poor
in a crisis. The range of traditional institutions
achieving the same end - collective work parties,
shared meals, community granaries, rainmaking
ceremonies or collective prayers in times of food
shortage which include the redistribution of food or
money from richer to poorer - is very large in Africa.
At a different level, destitute members of one
community may go to other communities to beg for
work or charity. An undocumented and largely
unanalysed aspect of recent famines is the way many
slightly less poor rural communities have helped
slightly poorer communities to survive - an act of
apparent altruism explainable in terms of risk-
aversion in a longer perspective.
Claims on government are a particularly interesting
case. In many types of rural society, payments or
labour services to a dominant traditional political
authority do create an expectation ofa social contract,
under which the political authority is expected to help
in a crisis by redistributing food. The way this
operated to avert famine has been well documented by
Cissoko (1968) for the Songhay empire in the Niger
river valley in Mali for the century or so before the
chaos caused by the Moroccan invasion at the end of
the 16th century. Traditional political authorities in
many parts of the African dry belt continue to fulfill
this function to a limited extent, and at an anecdotal
level there are many stories of prosperous chiefs
ruining themselves to keep their followers alive in the
recent droughts; at the very least this suggests an
ideology of sharing in a crisis.
This is not a plea for a pre-colonial merrie Africa' in
which everyone shared and there was no famine. The
model proposed here is close to Watts' (1983)
reformulation, in respect of famine vulnerability in the
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Sokoto Caliphate in northern Nigeria, of the moral
economy argument of Thompson (1971) and Scott
(1976). The risk-avoidance strategies of pre-capitalist
rural societies extend beyond agricultural and pastoral
techniques into social and political mechanisms which
include, at one level, more formalised expectations
about the role of patrons or elite classes in ensuring
peasant subsistence needs in a crisis. This normative
subsistence guarantee spreads throughout the peasant
universe in widening circles of responsibility, from the
household, to extended kin, to village or pastoral clan
patrons or superior classes, and ultimately to the state
itself. This model does not suppose that villages or
pastoral clans are corporate entities without class or
status divisions; indeed, the moral economy emerges
as the outgrowth of class struggle over the subsistence
minimum and surplus appropriation. Governments,
elites or the wealthy control the poor but depend on
revenue derived from them. Within a common field of
force, the moral economy is necessary to the survival
of both ruler and ruled [Watts 1983:104-9].
Colonial and post-colonial governments in Africa
have not been very clear about their responsibilities in
this respect. The growth of commodity production
and market relations has strengthened food security in
some aspects, but has also undermined the redistri-
butive guarantees of the pre-colonial economy,
replacing them with an uncertain market mechanism.
As modern government has taken over the powers of
traditional political authorities, it has expropriated
the assets of rural people (including their stores,
physical investments and collective investments). It
has also imposed a substantial tax burden, offering in
theory in return some social security in the most
general sense, But although no colonial or post-
colonial government in Africa would presumably
deny a responsibility to keep its citizens alive in a
famine, few would go as far as the 1880 Indian Famine
Commission report, which stated:
there can be no doubt that a calamity such as
famine. . . is one which in a country such as India
wholly transcends individual effort and power of
resistance. It accordingly becomes the paramount
duty of the State to give all practicable assistance to
the people in time of famine, and to devote all its
available resources to this end.
[quoted in Drèze 1988:13-14]
To what extent people feel they have a claim on
government in a crisis is unclear. Urban people
certainly do, and successfully exercise that claim.
Rural people seem much more ambiguous and varied
in their responses: some do appear to call on
government not to let them starve, others do not. It
would be an interesting research question to relate this
to the tradition of effective central authority and high
tax payments. Do communities, for example in the
central Ethiopian highlands, where there is a long
tradition of this sort, have a greater expectation of
government support in a crisis? Do they call in their
claim more readily, abandoning efforts at self-help
much earlier than communities where there is no such
tradition, such perhaps. as Darfur (in terms of its
expectation ofthe Sudan central government) or many
Sahelian pastoral groups?
Reducing assets (including claims) makes households
and communities more vulnerable, and the analysis
could probably be extended to processes within
households, particularly in respect of gender and
intergenerational assets and claims. But this vulner-
ability will not be easily visible. Even tangible assets,
such as granaries or livestock are often concealed to
avoid expropriation by government, and many assets
are intangible. People may survive for a year or more
of crisis by cashing in physical assets and calling in
claims, and then exhaust them so that their ability to
survive appears suddenly to collapse, perhaps even at
a time when production or exchange relations are
improving.
The poorest people have fewest assets, so in general
the poorest households reach the threshold of collapse
much faster than others. Within socially-stratified
communities, low-status groups have fewest claims,
and so may reach the threshold faster than their other
asset holdings might predict. But low asset status is not
necessarily synonymous with greatest poverty. The
urban poor, and refugees in camps close to large
towns, though often very poor, do seem able to
exercise effective claims on the government for
perferential assistance, in a way poor rural people
generally can not.
The way nearly destitute people try desperately to
protect their assets in itself suggests something of their
importance, both for survival in a crisis, and for
recovery afterwards.
Historical Changes in Vulnerability
The asset status of rural communities does not remain
static, and the way it evolves is a prime determinant of
changing vulnerability. To illustrate this, I look at the
case of Sahelian West Africa, shown in Diagram 4.
It is difficult to summarise complex historical trends
into a single score, but we must try. Taking first the
production box, and considering processes in the 20th
century only, we may make the following estimates.
Climatic factors have been quite mixed, as has general
ecological potential, with dry periods causing
regression of vegetation and crops, and wet periods
their recovery. Agricultural technology has probably
on balance had a beneficial effect, although the
pattern with crops and cropping is less clear, with
some improved food crops but very uneven experience
with cash crops. The possibilities for off-farm
production activities have probably substantially
improved. In sunlmarv. the production box probably
deserves a mixed plus-minus mark.
In the exchange nox. wage labour possibilities have
probably substantially increased. The picture for
commodity markets is more uneven. Pastoral markets
have improved markedly, even though terms of trade
remain vulnerable. In agriculiural markets, cash crops
have offered much wider income-generating
opportunities. although prices have varied: food crop
m'arkets have generally declined. The exchange box
also gets on balance a plus-minus mark, perhaps with
more plusses than minuses.
The picture for the assets and claims box is more
complicated still. Human investments, in health and
education mainly, have probably improved, but most
other investments have declined, especially collective
investments in production-enhancing technologies
and common resource management: investments
deserves a plus-minus mark.
Stores and claims on the other hand, have declined in a
fairly unequivocal way, with the exception of claims
on the international community, which have only
worked late and inefficiently. Both deserve negative
marks.
The picture of historical changes in famine vulner-
ability, with the estimated marks for positive or
negative changes in vulnerability, is shown below.
Diagram 4
// AI
PRODUCTION CONSUMPTION
Such an exercise is very superficial, although no doubt
it could be done more rigorously. It does, however.
suggest that there has not been an equal increase in
vulnerability in all boxes of the model. The situation
has in fact been very mixed. However, if these marks
make any sense, the assets box has seen a clear decline,
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meaning greatly increased vulnerability from this
source. Is this a real marker to one of the reasons for
increased vulnerability to famine in such Sahelian
populations?
Put another way, has the increased economic
integration ofthe traditional Sahelian economies with
wider markets, and the corresponding decline in local
circulation of goods and services, achieved important
economic benefits for most producers, but at the cost
of significant increases in two sorts of vulnerability:
increased dependence on market transactions with
corresponding vulnerability to terms of trade failure.
and a reduction in physical assets and effective local
claims, inadequately compensated by a non-functional
social contract with central government?
Conclusions for Famine Policy
The analysis of assets and claims does appear to add
something to our understanding of famine vulnerability
additional to the insights from analysis of production
and exchange failures. lt gives a clearer idea of the way
famine is generated, who suffers most, the chronology
of economic and social collapse, and the thresholds at
which different groups become utterly destitute. It
explains why war and civil unrest, the most obvious
break in the moral economy and abrogation of claims
by government, are a crucial cause of vulnerability. It
also explains more about household and community
strategies to avoid famine and rebuild a life
afterwards. lt answers most of the questions raised
earlier about entitlement theory.
Perhaps it also helps us to ask more appropriate
questions about the apparent difference between
recent African and Indian famines. Those who are
most vulnerable to famine in India (especially
agricultural labourers and petty commodity and
services producers) are not necessarily the most
vulnerable in Africa (with the possible exception of
Sudan). Income failures for such people seem the most
important cause of Indian famines. Is this true of
Africa? Are assets more important to the survival of
rural people in Africa than they are in India, and asset
failure thus catastrophic? Are claims to community
support more effective in Africa most of the time, but
the situation resultingly catastrophic when such
support breaks down?
Perhaps most significantly, does the Indian govern-
ment now accept claims on it by starving people, as the
1880 Famine Commission urged it should, and so do
something about them (through famine codes,
employment guarantees, fair price shops, cattle
camps), in a way that African governments do not?
If this way of looking at famine vulnerability has some
virtue, it has clear implications for policy. A policy to
reduce vulnerability would not then necessarily be the
same as a policy against poverty, although it would
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have much in common, nor would it be the same as a
food policy, although a food policy should include a
policy on reducing vulnerability. A vulnerability
policy should include actions in the fields of
production, exchange and assets. Some potential
policy areas would include:
Early Warning
Low asset status in rural communities would be a
particularly good indicator of vulnerability.
Exchange Interventions
Interventions in the wage labour market (through
employment guarantees), and in commodity markets
(through price support) would reduce vulnerability.
Improving Assets and Claims
The main problem is how to rebuild the asset status of
rural communities in both tangible and intangible
assets. Making it easier for people to invest in health
and education would help - few households with one
educated member starve, perhaps precisely because
such people can effectively activate claims for
assistance from the government. Government can
assist recapitalisation and collective investments in
productive technologies. Cereal policy, instead of
emptying household and community grain stores,
should help keep them full; the same should apply to
bank accounts, other stores of value, and perhaps even
to new forms of insurance. Policy should revitalise and
strengthen systems of claims and responsibilities,
starting with a clearer and more effective view of
government responsibility and the legitimacy of
claims against it in a food crisis, but extending to and
including systems of local community support.
There are also lessons for emergency relief and food
aid. Rehabilitation of rural economies after famine
means not only reinstating their production status,
and ensuring that their exchange and terms of trade
relations are acceptable. It also means the much longer
tasks of rebuilding their asset status, and tlteir own
social frameworks through which claims and asset
sharing are organised. At present, relief tends to
undermine local organisational capability by imposing
procedures dictated by an understandable desire for
efficiency, donor accountability and short-term cost-
effectiveness. But local community structures are by-
passed whenever relief food is distributed to those who
qualify on a nutrition status criteria, or food-for-work
is organised in labour gangs for projects decided and
administered by the relief agency. If local organi-
sational capacity is an important resource in making
communities less vulnerable, actions such as these,
even if they save lives in the short run, contribute to
greater vulnerability in the long run. Food aid in
particular, in relief programmes, should be used not
only to save lives but also to protect assets; in
rehabilitation programmes, food aid should be used
more explicity to rebuild household and community
assets, and to rebuild local organisational capability.
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